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Abstract 
This paper analyses income distribution effects of investment support granted under the EU 
RDP. It shows that implementation details of the support (the size of allocated funds, 
enforcement of additionality, eligibility limits) and market conditions (farm heterogeneity, 
farm access to credit, short-run versus long-run effects) affect income distribution effect of 
farm the investment support. With certain implementation of the support farms may gain part 
or even full support (when the additionality is not enforced and the total support is relatively 
small), while under different conditions farmers may loose (with perfect enforcement of the 
additionally and with significant increase in capital price). The implementation details interact 
with market structure and also determine the income distribution effects of the investment 
support. Introducing minimum thresholds as eligibility criteria may deter small farms from 
uptaking the investment support while maximum eligibility threshold may restrict big farms 
to take desired level of support. Benefits from investment support are shared with capital 
suppliers. Gains of capital suppliers depend on the size of the capital supply elasticity and are 
conditional on the EU support to increase capital prices.  
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Introduction 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU supports agricultural sector through two 
mechanisms. First, farms receive support through market intervention policies which are also 
known as first pillar policies. The first pillar policies include direct coupled and decoupled 
income support and other market intervention policies (e.g. market price support, trade 
measures, production quotas, etc.). Second, the CAP supports rural economy through the 
Rural Development Policies (RDP), known as second pillar policies. The RDP includes 
various measure targeted either at farm (e.g. investment support, agri-environmental support) 
or at rural community (e.g. infrastructural investments). In 2007 the total EU budget spending 
on CAP was around 52 billions, out of which 20% went to RDP (EUR-Lex 2008). 
There is extensive literature analysing the income distributional effects of the first pillar types 
of agricultural policies (Alston and James, 2002; Ciaian and Swinnen 2006, 2009; Ciaian, 
Kancs and Swinnen 2008; Ciaian et al. 2001; Dewbre, Anton, and Thompson 2001; Gardner 
1983; Guyomard, Mouël, and Gohin 2004; Salhofer 1996). Among others, studies have 
analyzed how these effects differ among policies and how results are affected by market 
imperfections and policy details (McCorriston and Sheldon 1991; Salhofer and Schmid 2004; 
de Gorter 1992; Munk 1994; OECD 2007). 
However, little attention has been paid to income distribution effects of RDP in this literature. 
The RDP differ in several respects with the first pillar types of policies. The key differences 
are that the RDP have large diversity in policy focus and in implementation, the allocation of 
support is based on the additionality principle, the eligibility limits are imposed at beneficiary 
level, some RDP measures are allocated to non-agricultural activities, and in most cases the 
granting of EU support is not automatic but project based and subject to competition.  
There are several studies in the literature which apply various types of modelling approaches 
with the aim of simulating the impact of RDP on the rural economy (see table 1). However, 
these applied RDP models contain several weaknesses. One important weakness is the 
assumption of how RDP measures are incorporated in the models. The modelling of RDP is 
not consistent among different studies and differs by study. Often studies group various RDP 
measures in a single variable and assume that all RDP measures included in the variable 
affect farm incentives in the same way. Concerning the farm investment support, most studies 
do not simulate the effect of the investment support individually but aggregated with other 
measures (e.g. Balamou and Psaltopoulos 2006; Haile and Slangen 2007; Oglethorpe and 
Sanderson 1999; Verburg et al. 2008).   
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The policy on which this article focuses is farm investment support granted under the EU 
RDP. Farm investment support is the second largest measure within the RDP accounting for 
more than 10% of the total RDP spending in the programming period 2007-2013 (European 
Commission 2007). We show that implementation details of the investment support (the size 
of allocated funds, enforcement of additionality, and eligibility limits) affect income 
distribution effects of farm investment support. Various studies have documented that 
implementation details of agricultural policies matter on how the policy changes farm 
incentives and affects income distribution (e.g. Alston 2007; Ciaian, Kancs and Swinnen 
2008; Ciaian and Swinnen 2009; Kilian and Salhofer 2008). Additionally, the implementation 
details interact with farm heterogeneity and farm access to credit. We show that farm 
heterogeneity and farm access to credit have important implication for the income distribution 
effects of the EU farm investment support. To our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to 
analyse the income distribution effects of EU RDP. 
The paper is organized as follows. We begin with a brief literature review on RDP modelling. 
Next, we present the underlying partial equilibrium capital market model which we use for 
analyzing the income distributional effects. In section four we analyze the distributional 
impacts of farm EU investment support in the short-run considering different implementation 
characteristics of the support. Sections five, six and seven extend the analyses taking into 
consideration heterogeneous farms, imperfect rural credit markets and the long-run effects, 
respectively. The final section concludes by summarizing the key findings of the study. 
 
The Current State of the Art in RDP Modelling 
The RDP represent the second pillar support measures of the CAP. The RDP differ in several 
respects with the first pillar CAP market intervention policies: (i) the RDP include large 
number of measures each focusing on different areas of rural economy; (ii) implementation 
differs between measures and Member States; (iii) some RDP measures are allocated to non-
agricultural activities; (iv) for the majority of measures not all farms are eligible for RDP 
support, the support is restricted per farm and at the Member State level, and is based on the 
additionality principle; (iv) the granting of the majority of RDP support is not automatic but is 
project based and is subject to competition. 
According to EU regulation 1698/2005, the RDP support is divided in four Axes.1 Each Axis 
is further split in several policy measures with each focusing on a specific area of rural 
development. In general, RDP measures can be grouped in eight socioeconomic areas of rural 
development: farm restructuring and competitiveness; improvement of human capital; 
innovation; provision of basic rural services and related infrastructure; improving the quality 
of agricultural products; support for sustainable use of agricultural land; diversification of the 
rural economy; and support for improvement of environment (Copus 2007; Dwyer 2005). 
There is a growing body of research on the modelling of RDP. A summary of the literature is 
provided in Table 1. Most these studies are empirical and most of them simulate the effect of 
RDP on the rural economy. Little work was done to provide a consistent theoretical modelling 
framework of RDP.  
                                                 
1 Axis 1: improving the competitiveness of the agricultural and forestry sector; Axis 2: improving the 
environment and the countryside; Axis 3: quality of life in rural areas and diversification of the rural economy; 
and Axis 4: Leader instrument. 
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However, these empirical models contain several shortcomings. Various types of models were 
applied to simulate the effects of RDP: for example econometric models; regional SAM; 
general equilibrium models; partial equilibrium models; integrated assessment models, etc 
(Table 1). In general, these models focus on more than one RDP measure. Often the studies 
combine several RDP measures in one policy group (e.g. SCENAR 2020), group them by axis 
(e.g. Bergmann and Thomson 2008) or by area of RDP support (e.g. Psaltopoulos and 
Balamou 2006; Vollet 1998). To reduce the complexity of the model, the grouped measures 
are normally treated as one policy variable and are assumed to affect farm in the same way. 
This is an important weakness since different RDP measures are expected to create different 
incentives in the agricultural sector. Various studies have documented that implementation 
details of agricultural policies matter on how policies change farm incentives and how they 
affect the agricultural sector (e.g. Alston 2007; Ciaian, Kancs and Swinnen 2008; Kilian and 
Salhofer 2008).  
Additionally, an important weakness of the applied models is related to the farm behavioural 
assumptions of RDP. Particularly this concerns the assumption made on the way the RDP 
measures are considered to affect farm incentives (table 12). Often same RDP measures are 
modelled differently in different studies implying that the modelling of the RDP differs by 
study (table 1). For example, Psaltopoulos and Balamou (2006) model the agri-environmental 
measures similarly as the income support policies. On the other hand, Oglethorpe and 
Sanderson (1999) are more explicit. They assume that agri-environmental policies lead to 
adjustment of farm management practices (e.g. restricting stocking density, fertilizer use, 
etc.). In some cases the modelling of RDP appears to be ad-hoc and oversimplified. For 
example, Balamou and Psaltopoulos (2006) assume that RDP payments exogenously increase 
output demand of the construction sector in the analysed region (table 1). In most cases, the 
choice of behavioural assumptions is a compromise solution between various constraints 
faced by modellers such as the focus of the study, type of the model, model structure, data 
availability, or/and differences in regional implementation of RDP measures. 
Many of the applied models are case or region specific (e.g. Haile and Slangen 2007; 
Oglethorpe and Sanderson 1999), restricting their use for other policies, problems and/or 
regions. Often this is caused be the fact that the modelling of RDP requires a large set of 
region/situation specific data which are not available at EU level. Another reason is that RDP 
impacts are case or region specific. This is particularly the case of models focusing on agri-
environmental measures (van Ittersum et al. 2008). For example, Contingent Valuation 
Method is used to estimate the consumers' willingness to pay for environmental benefits 
(Drake 1992). The estimated willingness to pay for environmental product in one region is not 
applicable in other regions. This is because environmental products are heterogeneous goods 
and their supply quality and quantity is region specific depending on local characteristics.    
Concerning the farm investment support, from all studies reviewed in table 1 only Felici et al. 
(2008) explicitly simulate the impact of the farm investment support on rural economy. They 
use regional economic model REMI-IRPET. They assume that the investment support 
(modernisation of agricultural holdings) reduces capital cost in agricultural sector. Based on 
the results derived in this paper, this assumption holds in the case when the investment 
additionality is perfectly enforced. Most other studies do not simulate the effect of the 
investment support individually. Often the studies aggregate the investment support with 
other RDP measures in one policy variable. 
                                                 
2 For some models it was not possible to indentify how RDP were modelled. 
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The model 
In this section we develop a partial equilibrium model to analyse income distribution effects 
of farm investment support granted under the RDP. This approach is widely used in the 
literature to investigate the income distribution effects of agricultural policies (Alston and 
James, 2002; Ciaian and Swinnen 2006, 2009; Gardner 1983; Guyomard, Mouël, and Gohin 
2004; Salhofer 1996). A key advantage of using partial equilibrium model as compared to the 
general equilibrium model is that it reduces the complexity of the analyses and it allows 
identifying the effects of the investment support on agricultural sector. The shortcoming of 
the partial equilibrium analysis is that it does not take into account inter-sectoral effects. 
Depending on the type of the effect, the partial equilibrium results may be strengthened or 
offset by the inter-sectoral effects. The share of the agricultural sector is small in the overall 
economy in the EU implying that the inter-sectoral effects should be relatively small.  
The representative farm output is assumed to be a function of the amount of capital ( K ) and 
non-capital inputs ( A ), which we refer to as “land” but which captures also other non-capital 
inputs used by the farm (e.g. labor). The production function is represented by ),( KAf  with 
0>if , 0<iif , 0>ijf ,3 for i, j = A and K. We assume decreasing/constant return to scale 
production function. We assume that the purchase of capital (K) is financed from the bank 
loan (L) at interest rate i assumed to be fixed. Farms are assumed to have unconstrained 
access to loans.4 This model is based on the notion that capital price will equal the discounted 
present value of future rents.  
More precisely, this model implies four agents in the agricultural capital good market: 
representative farm, loan suppliers (banks), capital suppliers (e.g. tractor suppliers), and the 
government. Loan suppliers provide loans to farms. Farms use loans to buy capital goods 
from capital suppliers. Farms use the services of the capital goods to produce agricultural 
products. Government intervenes in the capital market. 
The farm profit function is given as follows: 
(1) kKrAKApf −−=∏ ),(  
where ( )δ+= iRk , p is the price of the final product5, r is the price of non-capital inputs, k is 
rental price of capital and R is unit price of capital. The farm capital rental cost per unit of 
capital includes interest costs (payments) iR  and the depreciation costs Rδ .  
Farm equilibrium conditions are given as follows: 
(2) ( )δ+== iRkpf K  Farm capital services FOC condition 
                                                 
3 if  and iif  are first and second derivatives of the production function with respect to its arguments, 
respectively. 
4 We will relax this assumption later.  
5 We assume that the economy is small and open, which implies that the output price is fixed. 
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(3) rpf A =   Farm land FOC condition 
(4) RKLD =    Farm loan demand 
(5) KSK =   Capital good market equilibrium condition 
(6) ASA =   Land market equilibrium condition 
where KS  is capital supply function and AS  is land supply function. Equations (2) and (3) 
represent the representative farm capital and land marginal conditions, respectively, derived 
from the farm profit maximization problem. The equilibrium condition (2) yields standard 
capitalization formula (i.e. ( )δ+= ipfR K ) which implies that capital price is equal to the 
present value of the future capital rents. The total farm loan demand ( DL ) in equation (4) is 
determined by the capital price and quantity of capital demanded by farm ( RK ). With perfect 
credit markets the farm access to loans is unconstrained which implies that farm can obtain 
loan for all its capital requirements. Equations (5) and (6) are market clearing equilibrium 
conditions for capital goods and land, respectively.  
The capital market is illustrated in Figure 1. The conditions (2) and (3) determine the farm’s 
(annual) demand for capital services. The total demand of capital services is represented by 
the curve D in the quadrant I in Figure 1.6 The curve D shows capital rental price k which 
farm is willing to pay for capital services used in the production process.  
We assume that the purchase of capital is financed from bank loan. The quadrant II shows the 
total farm loan demand LD. The combination of farm capital demand (K) and farm willingness 
to pay for capital rental price (k) - given alongside the curve D - determine the farm loan 
requirement. More specifically, the farm willingness to pay the capital rental price k 
determines the per unit interest payment for loan ( RkiR δ−= ). The total farm loan LD is then 
determined by the interest payment and total farm capital demand given along the demand 
curve D.7 With perfect credit markets all farm credit requirement are fulfilled. This implies 
that the shape of farm loan LD is determined by the farm demand of capital services D. The LD 
increases with farm capital demand (K) and decreases with capital rental costs (k) as shown by 
the downward slopping curve LD in quadrant II. 
The quadrant III shows the capital price curve (RD) which represents the farm willingness to 
pay for capital. For a given interest rate and depreciation rate, the capital price is determined 
simultaneously with the value of farm loan LD. This is because capital price is determined by 
the farm willingness to pay for capital rental price given in equation (2). In the same time the 
capital price represents the loan per unit of capital which farm can obtain in return for paying 
the interest payment iR . This implies that the loan per unit of capital is equal to the capital 
price. Similarly to LD, the shape of the farm capital price curve RD is determined by the farm 
demand of capital services D which implies downward sloping RD. 
The quadrant IV shows market for capital goods. Farm capital good demand DK is determined 
by the combination of farm willingness to pay for capital goods RD (shown in the quadrant 
III) and demand for capital services (shown in the quadrant I). Farm uses the loan to pay the 
                                                 
6 One can extend the graphical exposition to land market. We restrict our attention only to capital market as farm 
capital is the main focus of the paper.   
7 Because the price of capital (R) is equal to the presents value of future stream of capital rents (equation (2)), 
this implies that for interest rate i farm can obtain per unit of capital a loan equal to the price of capital.  
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purchase of capital (shown in the quadrant II). The farm demand of capital goods DK has a 
negative slope similar to the farm demand of capital services (D) shown in the quadrant I. 
For example, if the capital rental price is k1, the optimal farm capital use is K1 (quadrant I). 
For a given interest rate i and capital depreciation rate δ , then k1 implies that with perfect 
credit markets farm can obtain bank loan of size L1 (quadrant II). Further, k1, K1 and L1 imply 
that farm is willing to pay for capital K1 the price equal to R1. Similar can be shown for the 
rest of equilibrium situations which implies downward sloping capital good demand DK. 
Finally, the curve SK in the quadrant IV represents supply of capital goods. In an analogous 
way to farm capital demand, one can derive from the supply of capital goods SK the (annual) 
supply of capital services (S) (quadrant I). For example, capital suppliers are willing to sell K2 
for the price R2 (given along the curve RS in the quadrant III). The K2 and R2 imply loan L2 
(given along the curve LS in the quadrant II)8 which is needed to pay to capital supplier for the 
supply of capital K2. This loan further implies unit capital rental costs equal to k2. Similar can 
be shown for the rest of equilibrium situations which implies upward sloping supply of capital 
services S shown in the quadrant I. 
The intersection between the demands (D, DK) and the supplies (S, SK) yields the equilibrium 
bundle of capital rental price, loan, capital price and quantity of capital (k*, L*, R*, K*), 
respectively (Figure 1). The quadrant I shows (annual) capital rents and supply and demand of 
capital services while the quadrant IV shows the discounted present value of annual capital 
rents and supply and demand of capital goods. In further analyses we restrict our attention to 
annual rents and supply and demand of capital services shown in quadrant I in Figure 1. This 
is consistent with the other studies on income distribution effects of agricultural policies (e.g. 
Alston and James, 2002; Ciaian and Swinnen 2006; Dewbre, Anton, and Thompson 2001; 
Gardner 1983; Guyomard, Mouël, and Gohin 2004).  
To simplify the analyses we split the analyses in two effects: (i) short-run direct effect and (ii) 
long-run indirect effect.9 We assume that in the short-run the investment support affects only 
capital market. Land input is assumed to stay fixed. This implies a situation where the farm 
reacts to the policy by adjusting capital use while it keeps other inputs unchanged. In the 
long-run it is assumed that the capital support induces indirect changes on the other 
agricultural markets. In terms of our model this implies that farm may also adjust non-capital 
inputs (land). 10  
 
The impact of farm EU investment support in the short-run 
                                                 
8 Note that the loan requirement corresponding to capital supply LS differs with the loan requirement 
corresponding to the capital demand LD except at the equilibrium point L*. This is because the bundles of 
quantity of capital and capital price (or rental price) along demand and supply differ except at point L*.  
9 This is only for exposition purposes. The general results of the paper are not affected. 
10 This is somehow inconsistent with the general use of this term in the literature. In general variable inputs are 
assumed to change in the short-run while capital is assumed to change only in the long-run. Because our 
objective is to analyse the effect of capital investment support, the change in farm capital is a short-run effect of 
the policy. Then in the long-run the farm adjusts other inputs taking in consideration the capital investment 
support. 
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In this paper we focus on the following three implementation details of the farm investment 
support granted under the EU RDP: (i) the investment support rate; (ii) farm eligibility limits 
(minimum and maximum thresholds imposed on the size of investment support a farm can 
obtain); (iii) the enforcement of investment additionality. 
Under the EU RDP investment support programme farms can obtain a grand to partly finance 
the costs of capital purchases. The farm investment support is co-financed from the EU RDP 
budget and from the national budget. The support rate ranges between 40% and 75% of the 
total value of capital purchase costs. The support rate vary by region and by farm 
characteristics. Farms located in less developed/productive regions and younger farms may 
benefit from a higher support rate than other farms. 
The size of the investment support is limited at farm level, regional level and EU level. For 
example, in England the maximum rate of grant per beneficiary is 400 000 EUR outside Less 
Favoured Areas (LFA) and 500 000 EUR within LFA. In Bavaria, Germany, the minimum 
grant eligible for this support is 30 000 EUR while the maximum grant is 150 000 EUR. 
Other MS impose similar eligibility limits.  
In general, the policy objective is to increase the quantity or/and the quality of the farm 
capital, i.e. to create additionality effect. In terms of our model this implies that the policy 
objective is to increase the stock of capital relative to the capital stock used by farmers at the 
prevailing market prices of capital. We consider two cases in this paper: perfect enforcement 
of the additionality and imperfect (no) enforcement of the additionality. 
We show that these implementation details importantly affect income distribution effect of the 
investment support. Additionally, we show that the impacts are affected by farm 
heterogeneity and farm excess to credit.  
In this section we analyse the effect of investment support in the short-run (the direct effect) 
by assuming one representative farm and perfect credit markets. In the next two sections we 
extend the analysis by taking in consideration farm heterogeneity, imperfect credit markets 
and long-run (indirect) effects, respectively.  
 
Perfect enforcement of additionality and no eligibility limits 
In this section we assume that policy makers can perfectly enforce the additionality of 
investment and we assume that there are no limits imposed on the size of the eligible support. 
In the next sections we will relax these assumptions. The perfect enforcement of the 
additionality implies that the policy makers are able to enforce a situation where farm increase 
capital use by the size of the supported investment relative to the capital use at the prevailing 
market prices of capital. In other words, not all farm capital benefits from farm investment 
support. The support benefits only the additional farm capital. 
Let α denote the investment support rate of the EU RDP programme. The support rate α  is 
represented as the share of the total value of the supported investment (purchase costs of 
supported capital investment). With the investment support and perfect enforcement of the 
additionally the farm profit function (1) changes as follows: 
 10
(7) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) sosososo KRikkKrAKKApfKRiRRRKirAKKApf αδαδ −−−−+=+−−+−−+=∏ ),(),(
 
where ( )Rik δ+= , oK  is the farm capital use at prevailing market rental price of capital in 
the absence of the investment support, and sK  is capital which benefits from the investment 
support.  
The value of support per unit of capital is equal to the capital price multiplied by the support 
rate ( Rα ). Then the unit purchase cost of capital with the support is equal to ( )RR α− . The 
investment support reduces capital purchase costs. This further implies that capital interest 
costs with the support change to ( ) ( )iRiRR αα −=− 1 .11 Because we assume perfect 
enforcement the additionally only the farm capital in excess of oK  is eligible for the support 
(i.e sK ) as represented in the profit function (7). The farm capitol FOC changes as follows:
12 
(8) ( ) ( ) RRipfiRkpf KK δαα −−−=−− 1  
Equation (8) implies that the marginal interest costs of capital are reduced by the support rate 
α .  
Hypothesis 1: in the short-run, with perfect enforcement of investment additionality, with 
support rate α , with no eligibility limits, and with perfect rural credit markets (i) farms may 
gain or lose from investment supports; (ii) total welfare decreases and (iii) the optimal level 
of support uptake by farms depends on the support rate. 
Following the capital market illustrated in Figure 1 we focus our graphical exposition on the 
quadrant I which shows the relationship between the supply and demand of capital services 
and (annual) the capital rental price. The equilibrium bundle of capital rental price and the 
quantity of capital without support is (k*, K*) (Figure 2). If the investment additionality is 
perfectly enforced and if the total support is not constrained then the equilibrium with the 
support shifts to (k1*, K1*). The rental price of capital and the farm capital use increase. The 
capital Ks represents the optimal (maximum) amount of supported investment which farms are 
willing to undertake in the equilibrium. Farms are willing to uptake the investment support up 
to the point where the support rate is equal to the gap between the market rental price ( *1k ) 
and the farm willingness to pay for capital ( 3k ) given by the curve D. In Figure 2 this is the 
case at *1K  where 3
*
1
*
1 kkiR −=α .13 Higher or lower uptake of the investment support will 
reduce farm gains. With the additionality perfectly enforced only part of the capital (Ks) 
receives investment support while the rest of the capital equal to oK  does not receive the 
                                                 
11 We consider the case when the support affects only the farm interest costs. This is consistent with the 
implementation of the RDP investment support. The support finances cost of purchase of capital. The 
depreciation costs (δR) are not eligible for the support. 
12 Note that land (A) in the short-run is assumed to be fixed. 
13 The maximum (optimal) amount of support which farm is willing to undertake is at the point where the curve 
sD  intersects the capital supply curve S . The curve sD  represents farm capital demand with the investment 
support. The curve sD  is not parallel with the capital demand without the support D  because the support rate α  is a share parameter. 
 11
support. The perfect enforcement of the additionally implies that only capital in excess of 
capital which farms would use at the market prevailing rental price *1k  (i.e. so KKK =−*1 ) is 
eligible for the support.  
Note that the equilibrium increase in capital is smaller than the size of the supported 
investment sK . This is because as capital price increases, farms reduce the capital use by 
oKK −* . In equilibrium, capital stock increases only by **1 KK −  (< sK ). In order to offset 
the price effect, the supported investment must be higher than the size of the equilibrium 
capital increase, **1 KKK s −> .  
Area BC represents farm loses due to capital price increase. Area CDEFG is total rental cost 
of supported investment sK . Area CDEF is the farm gain from the support received for sK . 
Finally, the area CFG is farm return from using sK  in production process. Subtracting farm 
costs from farm gains, the total farm net gain from the investment support equals area F – 
area B. Whether the farm gains or loses depends on the capital supply and demand elasticities. 
If area F is larger than area B then the farm gains otherwise the farm loses from the 
investment support.14 The capital suppliers gain (area BCD) because of higher capital price. 
The net welfare effect is a loss equal to area E. The area E is deadweight loss resulting from 
the misallocation of capital recourses. 
In Figure 3 we show the case with perfect elastic capital supply S. This implies that farm 
sectors cannot affect capital good price. The equilibrium without the support in Figure 3 is 
(k*, K*) and with the support is (k*, K2*). Now the increase of capital is equal to the size of the 
support investment sKKK =− **2 . This is because with perfect elastic capital supply, higher 
demand for capital does not affect the capital rental price.  Farms’ gains equal to area B. The 
capital suppliers do not gain because the capital rental price does not change. Total welfare 
decreases by area A.  
 
Perfect enforcement of additionality and eligibility limits 
In this section we still assume that policy makers can perfectly enforce the investment 
additionality but now we add the eligibility limits. The eligibility limits implies that the 
support size a farm can receive is constrained by a lower and/or upper bound. We assume that 
the minimum and maximum size of the investment eligible for the support is minK  and maxK , 
respectively. These eligibility limits imply that farm's supported investment must be larger 
than minK but smaller than maxK , maxmin KKK s << . 
Hypothesis 2: in the short-run, with perfect enforcement of investment additionality, with 
support rate α , and with perfect rural credit markets, minimum and maximum eligibility 
thresholds affect distribution of policy rents and may deter farms from uptaking the support. 
                                                 
14 Area F increases with farm capital demand elasticity and with capital supply elasticity. Area B decreases with 
capital supply elasticity and is not affected by farm capital demand elasticity. 
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To simplify the figure and the analyses we assume a perfect elastic capital supply. The effect 
is shown in Figure 4. The equilibrium without the support is ( *k , *K ). The eligibility limits 
determine farm support uptake and the farm gains from the support.  
First, we assume that the minimum and maximum size of investment eligible for the support 
is such that **2min KKK −≤  and **2max KKK −≥ , respectively, where *2K  is the equilibrium 
with no eligibility limits and with the support as shown in Figure 3. With these eligibility 
limits, the farm will not be constrained in terms of the support size it wishes to uptake. The 
equilibrium with the support shifts to ( *k , *2K ) (Figure 4). This is the same equilibrium as in 
the case with no eligibility limits shown in Figure 3.15 Farm's equilibrium supported 
investment is equal to sK , where 
**
2 KKK s −= . The equilibrium supported investment is 
lower than the maximum threshold and larger than the minimum threshold required, 
maxmin KKK s << . The equilibrium farm support uptake is determined at the point where the 
support level just covers the gap between the market rental price of capital and the farm 
marginal return to capital (i.e. at *2K  where 1
** kkiR −=α  (see hypothesis 1)) and this is not 
affected by the edibility limits. The farm gains from the support in Figure 4 is equal to area 
BE (which is equal to area B in Figure 3 with no eligibility limits). Total welfare decreases by 
area AD.  
The equilibrium ( *k , *2K ) will be affected by the eligibility limits only when the minimum 
eligibility threshold is larger than **2 KK −  ( **2min KKK −> ) and/or when the maximum 
threshold is smaller than **2 KK − , **2max KKK −<  (Figure 4). For example, if the minimum 
threshold is 1minK  (where 
**
21min KKK −> ), the farm must invest minimum 1minK  in order to 
be eligible for the support. With 1minK  farm profit change by area BE – area G. If area BE is 
larger than the area G, the farm gains. If area BE is smaller than area G, the farm loses and 
will not uptake the investment support. In the former case the equilibrium with the support 
shifts to ( *k , *4K ). In the latter case the equilibrium with and without the investment support 
is the same ( *k , *K ) and farm will not uptake the support. 
Consider the second case when the maximum threshold is lower than **2 KK − , i.e. 
**
2max KKK −< . For example, if the maximum eligibility threshold is 1maxK  in Figure 4, the 
equilibrium with the support is ( *k , *3K ). Because of the eligibility constraint the farm cannot 
obtain more support than 1maxK , where sKKKK <−= **31max . In this case the maximum 
threshold 1maxK  reduces the uptake of the support and thus affects also farm gains/losses from 
the support. In Figure 4 the farm gains equal to area B which is less than the gain with no 
eligibility limits given by the area BE. Total welfare decreases by area A.  
 
Imperfect enforcement of additionality and no eligibility limits 
                                                 
15The equilibrium ( *k , *2K ) in Figure 4 is the same as in Figure 3. 
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In this section we consider a situation when policy makers are not able to enforce investment 
additionality. We also assume that there are no eligibility limits.  
With the investment support and no enforcement of the additionally the farm profit function 
(1) changes as follows: 
(9) ( )[ ] ( )KRikrAKApfKRiRRrAKApf αδα −−−=+−−−=∏ ),(),(  
Now all capital benefits form the support. The farm capitol FOC is given by equation (8).  
Hypothesis 3: in the short-run, with support rate α , with no eligibility limits, with perfect 
rural credit markets and if the investment additionally is not enforced farms and capital 
suppliers gain and total welfare decreases.  
This effect is shown in Figure 5. The equilibrium without the support is (k*, K*). The 
equilibrium with the support shifts to (k2*, K2*). In equilibrium total support uptake is equal to 
sK , where 
*
2KK s = . Similar to the case of perfect enforcement of investment additionality 
shown in Figure 2, the farm is willing to uptake the investment support up to the point where 
the support level is equal to the gap between the equilibrium rental price of capital and the 
farm willingness to pay for capital. In Figure 5 this is the case at *2K  where 3
*
2
*
2 kkiR −=α . 
However, farm receives support for all capital in Figure 5 because we assume no enforcement 
of the additionality. Because policy makers are not able to enforce the additionality, farm uses 
all capital to claim the support. The support increases farm capital by **2 KK − . Now, farm 
gains from the support. Farm gains equal to area HF.16 Capital suppliers gain area BCD 
because of higher capital price. Total welfare loss is equal to area E.  
In Figure 6 we show the case with perfect elastic capital supply S. The equilibrium without 
the support is (k*, K*) and with the support is (k*, K2*). Total support is equal to *2KK s =  and 
the capital use increases by **2 KK − . Farm gains equal to area C. The capital suppliers do not 
gain because the capital rental price is not affected by the support. Total welfare decreases by 
area A.  
 
Imperfect enforcement of additionality and eligibility limits 
In this section we assume that policy makers cannot enforce the additionality and that there 
are limits imposed on the support size a farm can receive. Again we assume that the minimum 
and maximum size of the investment eligible for the support is minK  and maxK , respectively. 
Hypothesis 4: in the short-run, with no enforcement of investment additionality, with support 
rate α , and with perfect rural credit markets, minimum and maximum  eligibility thresholds 
affect distribution of policy rents and may deter farms from uptaking the investment support. 
                                                 
16 This is because with no enforcement of the investments additionally higher farm capital costs induced by 
higher capital rental price (given by area B in Figure 5) are covered by the support as now all capital is eligible 
for the support. In the case with full enforcement of the additionality, the farm did not receive support for all 
capital. For example, in Figure 2 the support did not cover the farm capital costs given by area B which were 
induced by higher capital rental price (area B in Figure 5 is equal to area B in Figure 2). 
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To simplify the analysis we assume perfect elastic capital supply. The effect is shown in 
Figure 7. The equilibrium without the support is ( *k , *K ). First, we assume that the 
minimum and maximum size of investment eligible for the support is such that *2min KK ≤  
and *2max KK ≥ , respectively, where *2K  is the equilibrium capital with the support and with 
no eligibility limits (see hypothesis 3). These eligibility limits do not constrain farm in terms 
of the size support it wishes to uptake. This implies that the equilibrium with the support and 
with and without the eligibility limits is the same at ( *k , *2K ) (Figure 7 and Figure 6). The 
farm uses investment support equal to sK , where 
*
2KK s = . The farm gains from the support 
equal area CBE. Total welfare effect is a loss equal to area AD (Figure 7).  
The equilibrium ( *k , *2K ) will be affected in all cases when the minimum eligibility threshold 
is larger than *2K  (if 
*
2min KK > ) and/or when the maximum threshold is smaller than *2K  (if 
*
2max KK < ) (Figure 7). For example, if the minimum threshold is 1minK  (where *21min KK > ), 
the farm must invest minimum 1minK  in order to be eligible for the support. With 1minK  the 
farm profits change by area CBE – area G. If area CBE is larger than area G, the farm gains. 
However, if area CBE is smaller than area G, the farm loses and will not uptake the support. 
In the former case the equilibrium with the support shifts to ( *k , *4K ). In the latter case the 
farm will not uptake the investments and the equilibrium with and without the support is the 
same ( *k , *K ). 
The maximum threshold affects the equilibrium ( *k , *2K ) if 
*
2max KK <  (Figure 7). We 
distinguish two cases: 1) *2max
* KKK <<  and 2) *max KK < . In the first case when 
*
2max
* KKK <<  the investment support will still distort the capital market and the 
equilibrium capital use will be between *K  and *2K  depending on the size of maxK . Farm will 
be able to uptake less support than desired and thus farm policy gains will be reduced relative 
to farm gains with no eligibility limits shown in Figure 6. 
In the second case when *max KK <  the farm takes the decision on either to increase capital or 
to keep capital unchanged relative to the equilibrium capital without no support *K . The farm 
will weight benefit of both options. If the benefits from keeping capital unchanged are larger 
than the benefits from the capital increase, the farm will choose not to increase capital. 
Hypothesis 5: in the short-run, with no enforcement of investment additionality, with support 
rate α , with perfect rural credit markets, and if *max KK <  farms do not increase capital use 
and benefit all investment support. 
We show the effect in Figure 8. The equilibrium without the support is ( *k , *K ). We assume 
that maximum eligibility thresholds is 2maxK , where 
*
2max KK < .17 The farm cannot obtain 
more support than 2maxK .  
                                                 
17 This implies that 2max2min KK < . 
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In the case when the farm keeps capital unchanged at *K  and receives support its gain is 
equal to area D. Farm uses capital K3 to claim the support, where 2max3 KK = . However, if 
farm increases its capital use by the size of the maximum eligibility threshold 2maxK , the 
equilibrium shifts to ( *k , *3K ). In this case farm gain is equal to area B. Because area D is 
larger than area B, the farm's optimal decision is not to increase capital. Hence, the 
equilibrium with and without the support is ( *k , *K ) and all the support (area D) benefits 
farm. The support does not create distortions in the capital market. 
The intuition behind this result is that with perfect credit markets farms can exploit all 
profitable investment opportunities even without the support. Perfect credit markets allow 
farms to finance all investments desired. Providing investment support to farmers does not 
alter investment opportunities available to farms. Farms optimal behaviour is to use the same 
quantity of capital with and without the support. We show in the section sixth that this will 
change if farms are credit constrained.  
 
The impact of farm EU investment support with heterogeneous farms and eligibility 
limits  
In this section we extend the analyses by taking in consideration farm heterogeneity. The 
impact of the investment support may be affected by farm heterogeneity in the case when the 
eligibility limits are imposed. Under certain conditions, the eligibility limits may either deter 
small farms from uptaking the support or it may constraint big farms in uptaking the desired 
level of the support. Farm size varies significantly across EU. In old EU Member States farm 
size varies from small size to medium size while in the New Member States the farm size 
varies from subsistence farms (1-6 ha) to large farms (up to 1000 ha). In this context, 
depending on the size of eligibility limits, the impact farm investment support may differ 
strongly among EU Member States. 
To analyse the effect of farm investment support with heterogeneous farms, we assume two 
representative farms, farm 1 and farm 2, respectively. We also assume that the minimum and 
the maximum size of the investment eligible for the support is minK  and maxK , respectively. 
The effect is shown in Figure 9 where 1D  and 2D  represent capital demand of farm 1 and 
farm 2, respectively. D  represents aggregate capital demand.18 As before S represents capital 
supply. For simplicity we assume perfect elastic capital supply.19 The equilibrium without the 
support is ( *k , *10K ) and (
*k , *20K ), for farm 1 and farm 2, respectively.
20 For the aggregate 
market, the equilibrium without the support is ( *k , *K ).  
Hypothesis 6: in the short-run, with support rate α , with perfect rural credit markets, and 
with heterogeneous farms, whether farms uptake support or not and whether farms benefit 
                                                 
18 The aggregate capital demand is obtained by horizontal aggregation of farm 1 and farm 2 capital demands. 
19 The effects with inelastic capital supply can be obtained analogously. 
20 In terms of capital use Farm 1 is smaller than Farm 2, *20
*
10 KK < . 
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from the support on depend on the size of minimum/maximum eligibility threshold and on the 
enforcement of investment additionality. 
 
We analyse the case when investment additionality is fully enforced.21 The eligibility limits 
may affect farms differently depending to what extent farms are heterogeneous and on the 
size of the eligibility limits. The minimum eligibility threshold may deter some (small) farms 
(i.e. farm 1) from uptaking the support if it is set to high. On the other hand, the maximum 
threshold may constraint some (big) farms (i.e. farm 2) in uptaking the desired level of the 
support if it is set to low.  
For example, consider the minimum eligibility threshold minK  such that 
*
20
*
21min KKK −<  
and *10
*
11min KKK −>  where *11K  and *12K  are farm 1 and farm 2 equilibrium capital use with 
the support but without the edibility limits, respectively (Hypothesis 1). Without the edibility 
limits the optimal support uptake of farm 1 is smaller than the optimal support uptake of farm 
2, *20
*
21
*
10
*
11 KKKK −<− .  
The eligibility limit minK  does not affect farm 2 investment support uptake. With the 
investment support and with and without the eligibility limit, farm 2 equilibrium is ( *k , *21K ). 
Farm 2 gains equal to area B2 (Figure 9). However, the eligibility limit minK  has different 
impact on farm 1. The difference between farm 1 and farm 2 is that the marginal productivity 
of capital decreases faster with capital for farm 1 than for farm 2.22 The optimal level of 
support which farm 1 would be willing to undertake is *10
*
11 KK −  if the eligibility limit is not 
imposed. However, the minimum threshold is larger than *10
*
11 KK − , *10*11min KKK −> . Farm 
1 must invest minimum minK  in order to be eligible for the support. The effect of uptaking the 
support for capital minK  on farm 1 profits is given by area B1 – area E1. If the area B1 is larger 
than the area E1, farm 1 gains from the support. Otherwise farm 1 loses. In Figure 9 we 
assume that the area B1 is smaller than the area E1,23 implying that farm 1 would lose from the 
support and thus will not apply for the support. The minimum threshold is set too high for 
farm 1 and makes the support uptake unprofitable. Hence, the farm 1 equilibrium with and 
without the support is ( *k , *10K ). 
Now we look at the impact of the support on the aggregate market. If reading Figure 9 from 
the left hand side to the right hand side, the aggregate capital demand shifts from D D (which 
is the aggregate demand without the support) to D Ds (which is the aggregate demand with the 
support). For aggregate capital use larger than *K , the slope of the aggregate capital demand 
with the support is determined only by farm 2 capital demand. The equilibrium capital use of 
farm 1 will stay fixed at *10K . This is because farm 1 does not apply for investment support 
and it does not increase its capital beyond *10K . The aggregate market equilibrium shifts from 
                                                 
21 Similar analysis can be conducted for the case when the investment additionality is not enforced. 
22 For well behaved production function this implies that farm 1 is smaller than farm 2. 
23 We acknowledge that visually this is not the case. 
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( *k , *K ) to ( *k , *sK ). The aggregate capital increases. The capital increase is equal to the 
farm 2 capital increase, ss KKKKK 2
*
20
*
21
** =−=− . 
The maximum eligibility threshold maxK  affects farms investment uptake if it is set too low. 
For example, if *20
*
21max KKK −<  and *10*11max KKK −> , then the maximum eligibility 
threshold will constraint farm 2 in obtaining the desired level of support. The farm 2 optimal 
level of support uptake is *20
*
21 KK −  but it can obtain support only for capital maxK . Farm 1 is 
not affected by maxK  (Figure 9).  
 
Similar analysis can be conducted for the case when the investment additionality is not 
enforced. The minimum eligibility threshold may deter some (small) farms from uptaking the 
support while the maximum threshold may constraint some (big) farms in uptaking the 
desired level the support. For example, consider the minimum eligibility threshold 1mindK  in 
Figure 9 such that *111min KK >  and *201min KdK < . In this case farm 1 gains equal to area 11BF  
– area 1E . If the area 11BF  is larger than the area 1E  farm 1 gains. However, if the reverse 
holds, farm 1 loses implying that the farm will choose not to uptake the support. In the former 
case the equilibrium with the support shifts to ( *k , *12K ). In the latter case the farm will not 
uptake the investments and the equilibrium with and without the support is the same ( *k , 
*
10K ). 
 
The impact of EU farm investment support with imperfect rural credit markets 
With the presence of rural credit market imperfections, investment support can have an 
important impact on farm behaviour and hence on farm income. Access to rural credit is 
particularly the problem in new MS (e.g. Curtiss et al. 2007; Latruffe 2005; World Bank 
2001). However, there is evidence that farms in developed economies are also credit 
constrained (e.g. Benjamin and Phimister 2002; Blancard et al. 2006; Färe, Grosskopf, and 
Lee 1990). 24 We follow the approach of Mishra, Moss and Erickson (2008) and Ciaian and 
Swinnen (2009) to introduce farm credit constraint in the model.  
We analyze the impact of farm investment support with imperfect rural credit markets in the 
short-run. It is assumed that the maximum amount of credit that the farm can borrow ( cL ) 
depends on farm characteristics (W ) such as reputation and assets, i.e. ( )WLL cc = . With 
credit constraint the loan equation (4) changes as follows:25 
(10) )(WLRK c≤  
                                                 
24 There is vast theoretical and empirical literature on imperfections in rural credit markets, including the seminal 
work of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). 
25 This modeling of credit constraint implies that farm total capital use is constrained. The size of the constraint 
depends on various factors such as the ability to obtain credit from a bank which depends on the size of 
collateral, own savings, the ability to obtain credit through informal markets, etc.  
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In the short-run with a credit constraint the decision-making problem of the farms is the 
maximization of the profit function kKrAKApf −−=Π ),( , for a given land A, and subject to 
the credit constraint (10), as represented by the LaGrangean function: 
(11) ( )cLRKkKrAKApf −−−−=Ψ λ),(  
where λ  is the shadow price of the credit constraint.   
When the credit constraint is binding farms cannot use the unconstrained optimal level of 
capital and capital use is determined by RWLK c )(= . The farm optimal conditions with 
binding credit constraint ( 0>λ ) are given by: 
(12) 0=−− Rkpf K λ  
(13) 0=− cLRK . 
From equation (12) it follows that the farm marginal value product of capital is higher than 
the marginal cost of capital k: kpf K > . By increasing capital use the farm could increase its 
profit but it cannot use more capital because of the credit constraint.   
The effect is illustrated in Figure 10. We use the complete capital model as shown in Figure 1 
but with added credit constraint. The farm credit unconstrained loan size is given by the curve 
LD LD in quadrant II in Figure 10. With credit constraint the farm loan curve shifts to LD DcL . 
Up to loan size *cL  (and capital use cK ) farm is not credit constrained. At low levels of capital 
use the credit constraint is not binding, and the constrained loan curve LD DcL  coincides with 
the unconstrained curve LD LD.26 The *cL  represents the maximum loan which farm can obtain 
which implies vertical farm loan curve DcL  at 
*
cL  in quadrant II. The credit constraint implies 
that the farm demand of capital services shifts from D D to D Dc in quadrant I. This 
corresponds to a shift in the farm demand of capital goods from DK DK to DK DcK in quadrant 
IV. The equilibrium without the credit constraint is (k*, L*, R*, K*). The equilibrium with the 
credit constraint shifts to (kc*, *cL , Rc
*, Kc*). With credit constraint farms use less capital (Kc*< 
K*).  
 
The impact of the farm investment support 
When farms are granted investment support an important issue is how the support affects farm 
access to credit. One may expect an improvement of farm access to credits as the support 
reduces risk associated with the repayment of the loan. However, the size of the increase in 
the credit depends on various farm characteristics and market conditions. With the support the 
farm credit constraint changes as follows: 
(14) sc RKWLRK β+≤ )(  
                                                 
26 The shape of the farm loan curve with the credit constraint LD DcL  depends on the elasticity of farm demand of 
capital services.  
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where sK  is total supported investment, and β  measures the extent to which the support 
affects farm access to credit. If 1=β  then farms access to credit increases by the value of the 
total supported investment. In the case 10 ≤≤ β  farm's credit increases by less than the size 
of total supported investment.  
Hypothesis 7: in the short-run, with support rate α , and with  imperfect rural credit markets, 
(i) farms will have incentive to increase capital stock even without the enforcement of 
additionally, (ii) farms may gain or lose, and (iii) total welfare may increase. 
Next we consider two cases: (i) when the farm access to credit increases by the size of the 
supported investment ( 1=β ) and (ii) when the access to credit increases by less than the size 
of the supported investment ( 10 << β ). We assume that total supported investment is Ks. 
Further we assume that maxmin KKK s == . We illustrate the effects in Figure 11. Again we 
focus only on the quadrant I of Figure 10. For simplicity we assume perfectly elastic capital 
supply.  
Note, that with credit constraint farms have always incentive to increase capital use. This is 
because at the equilibrium with credit constraint (kc*, Kc*), farms marginal willingness to pay 
for additional capital ( 1k ) is larger than the rental costs of capital, 
*
1 kk > . This implies that it 
is profitable for farm to increase capital if access to credit increases. Moreover, the support 
marginally increases profitability by *ciRα . With the support farm marginal benefit from the 
additional capital is equal to **1 ciRkk α+− . Hence farm has incentive to increase capital if 
the support improves farm access to credit. In the hypothesis 1 and 5 where it was assumed 
perfect credit market, it was shown that if the total investment support is not significant, 
farm's optimal decision was not to increase capital use. Farms increased capital only when the 
additionality was enforced. The intuition is that with perfect credit markets farms were able to 
exploit all profitable opportunities even without the support. With imperfect credit markets, 
unexploited profitable investment opportunities are available. Farms would like to use these 
opportunities but they cannot because of credit constraint. The support gives farms the 
possibility to invest in these investment opportunities. This will be the case only when the 
support alleviates farm access to credit.  
First, we analyse the effect when the farm access to credit increases by the size of the 
supported investment ( 1=β ). We illustrate the case with the perfect elastic capital supply. 
The effect with imperfect elastic capital supply can be showed analogously. If the total 
investment support is equal to Ks and the farm access to credit increases by the same amount, 
the equilibrium in Figure 11 shifts to (k*, Kc2*). The farm gains from the investment support 
equal to area BD (Figure 11). Area B is productivity gain and area D is policy gain.27 Now 
total welfare effect is positive and equals area B. Total welfare increases because the 
investment support solves the credit market imperfection and thereby increases farm 
productivity. 
Second, we analyse the effect when the farm access to credit increases by less than the size of 
the supported investment ( 10 << β ). The effect is illustrated in Figure 12. If the total 
supported investment is equal to Ks, then the equilibrium shifts to (k*, Kc4*). Now the capital 
                                                 
27 Note that with imperfectly elastic capital supply, capital suppliers will gain from the support and farms may 
lose or gain because of rental price of capital increases. 
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increases by less than the supported investment because we assumed that farm access to credit 
increases by less than the size of the supported investment, scc KKK <− **4 . **4 cc KK −  
represents the size by which farm credit constrained is alleviated. The rest of the supported 
investment ( 3
*
cc KK − ) replaces the investment which the farm would make even without the 
support. The farm gains equal area DB (Figure 12). Area B is productivity gain and area D is 
policy gain. The total welfare increases by area B. 
Note that if the support shifts the equilibrium to ( *k , *K ) then the farm credit constraint is 
effectively removed. The farm will increase capital beyond *K  only if the investment 
additionally is enforced or/and if farm can obtain support for the capital in excess of *K . 
However, the capital increase beyond *K  would lead to welfare losses (see hypotheses 1-4).  
 
The impact of EU farm investment support in the long-run  
Up to now we analysed the short-run effects of the investment support. Farms were assumed 
to adjust only capital use as a response to introduction of the investment support. However, 
the indirect effect of the investment support is that farms adjust both inputs. Farms choose the 
quantity of capital and land that will maximize profits.  
If the investment support increases farm capital then the marginal productivity of other inputs 
used in the production process increases. This in turn will increase capital marginal 
productivity which will stimulate farms to invest even more. In other words, the farm capital 
demand shifts upwards.  
However, if the support does not increase capital use then the short-run and the long-run 
effects are the same. This is because the marginal productivity of other inputs are not affected 
if capital stays unchanged.  
Hypothesis 8: in the long-run farm gains from the investment support may be enhanced.  
The effect of investment support in the long-run is shown in Figure 13. We analyse the effect 
when the support is perfectly enforced implying that the support will lead to an increase in the 
capital use.28 We assume that total supported investment is Ks.  
In Figure 4 it was shown that in the short-run the farm capital demand is D  and the 
equilibrium with the maximum eligibility threshold 1maxK  is (k
*, K3*). In Figure 13 we also 
assume maximum eligibility threshold 1maxK .
29 Then the short-run equilibrium with the 
support (k*, K3*) in Figure 4 is equivalent to the short-run equilibrium with the support (k*, 
K3*) in Figure 13, where 1maxKK s = . In equilibrium the farm capital increases by 
sKKK =− **3 . 
In the long-run, the increase in capital use stimulates upward adjustment of other inputs. This 
in turn increases capital productivity and may stimulate farm to increase capital even more. In 
                                                 
28 When the support is not enforced, the effect can be derived analogously.   
29 This implies that 1maxmin KK < . 
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terms of Figure 13, farm capital demand shifts up, from D  to LD . Capital productivity 
increases, by π .30 In Figure 13 farm gains in the long-run equal to area FB plus area E.31 The 
area FB is policy gain and the area E is productivity gain.32 This implies that farm profits in 
the long-run (given by FB + area E) are higher relative to farm profits in the short-run (given 
by area B). Total welfare changes by area E – area A. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper analyses income distribution effects of investment support granted under the EU 
RDP. We have analysed how implementation details of the support (the size of allocated 
funds, enforcement of additionality, eligibility limits) affect income distribution effect of farm 
investment support. With certain implementation of the support farms may gain part or even 
all of the support (when the additionality is not enforced and the total support is relatively 
small), while under different conditions farmers may loose (with perfect enforcement of the 
additionally and with significant increase in capital price). Further, the implementation details 
interact with market conditions (farm heterogeneity, farm access to credit, short-run versus 
long-run effects) and also determine the income distribution effects of the investment support.  
In the short-run and with perfect credit markets, the size of farm policy gains depend on the 
extent to which investment additionality is enforced and on the eligibility limits. If 
additionality is not enforced and when the size of the support is not significant then farms 
gain all investment support but do not increase capital use. This is because farms are able to 
exploit all profitable investment opportunities even without the support and perfect credit 
markets allow them to finance all the desired investments. However, if the size of total 
support is sufficiently high, the support leads to increase in farm capital use and causes 
welfare losses.   
If the investment additionality is enforced, farm gains from the investment support are 
reduced. Moreover the total welfare decreases. This is because farms are forced to undertake 
socially unprofitable investments. With perfect credit markets farms can exploit all profitable 
investments even without the support. Farmers increase capital use because it is enforced. The 
size of capital increase depends on various factors but particularly on the capital supply 
elasticity and on the size of the support. 
Eligibility restrictions may have an important impact on the uptake of the investment support 
among farms and hence on the distribution of policy benefits. Introducing a high minimum 
threshold as eligibility criteria may deter small farms from uptaking the support even if the 
                                                 
30 Note that for simplicity we assume a parallel shift (by π ) of the farm capital demand in Figure 13. In reality 
this may not be the case. 
31 Note that these changes incorporate adjustments in other input use and that the profit changes in Figure 13 are 
an accurate representation of farm profit change induced by the support (see Just, Hueth, and Schmitz 2004). 
32 In the long-run even in the case of no enforcement of additionality farms may have incentive to increase 
capital relative to the situation without the support. This will be the case when the gain from increasing capital 
use by the supported investment dK (equal to area FB plus area E in Figure 13) is larger than the gain from 
replacing capital by dK (equal to dKk *α , where dKk *α  is equal to area AFB in Figure 13).  
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investment additionally is not enforced. The maximum eligibility threshold may restrict big 
farms to take desired level of support. 
With imperfect rural credit markets, farms will choose to increase capital use even without the 
enforcement of the investment additionality. This is because with constrained rural credit 
markets, there are still available unexploited profitable investment opportunities. At the same 
time, total welfare may increases as the support solves credit market imperfections and 
thereby increases farm productivity. However, both these effects are conditional on the 
support to alleviate farm access to credit.  
In the long-run perspective farm benefits from the investment support may be enhanced. This 
is induced by the indirect effect of support on the productivity of other inputs. If the 
investment support increases capital use, then the marginal productivity of other inputs used 
in the production increases. This in turn increases capital productivity which may lead to 
higher farm benefits from the investment support. 
Gains from the investment support are shared with capital suppliers. The capital suppliers' 
gains depend on the size of the capital supply elasticity. Gains decrease with the capital 
supply elasticity. For a certain value of capital supply elasticity, all the policy support may be 
shifted to capital suppliers through the higher price of capital. Moreover, in the case of full 
enforcement of investment additionality if the capital supply elasticity is sufficiently low, 
farms may loose and the capital suppliers may gain disproportionally more than the size of the 
support. This is because with perfect enforcement of the investment additionality, the policy 
support may increase capital price at the margins but farms are not fully compensated for the 
induced higher capital costs. However, the capital suppliers' gains from the support are 
conditional on the support to increase farm capital demand and capital prices. 
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Tables and figures 
Table 1. Summary of selected models used for analyzing impact of RDP  
Name of 
model/ Author 
Type of model Regional 
implementation 
Rural policies analyzed / 
modelled 
Impact indicator(s)  Modelling of RDP measures 
Bollman (1999) Econometric, single 
equation 
Community level data from 
the 1981 and 1991 Censuses 
of Population (Canada) 
Human capital (average years of 
schooling; and percentage of 
individuals with schooling) 
- Growth in labour earnings  
- Growth in employment  
The size and statistical significance of estimated 
coefficients corresponding to human capital proxies 
represent the size of the impact of human capital on 
labour markets.  
Balamou and 
Psaltopoulos 
(2006) 
Regional Social 
Accounting Matrices 
Three regions in Greece 
(rural municipalities 
Archanes and N. 
Kazantzakis and the urban 
centre of Heraklion) 
Decrease of farm income support  
by 20% and shift to Pillar 2 in the 
Archanes region. 
Output, income and 
employment 
The extra payments spent on Pillar 2 in Archanes were 
assumed to exogenously increase output demand of 
construction sector in the Archanes economy. 
Psaltopoulos and 
Balamou (2006) 
Regional Social 
Accounting Matrices 
Greece and one local 
economy of  Archanes 
(NUTS5)  
Various CAP scenarios: pillar 1 and 
pillar 2 measures combined. 
Various indicators: e.g. output, 
employment, land use, 
pollution emissions, etc. 
Pillar II support was assumed to increase capital in the 
case of investment measures or to increase agricultural 
subsidies in the case of agri-environmental measures. 
Their sectoral distribution was based on the 2000-06 
area allocation.  
REMI-IRPET 
model/ Felici et 
al. (2008) 
Regional economic 
model 
Tuscany region 
disaggregated at province 
level.  
- Setting up of young farmers 
- Early retirement  
- Modernisation of agricultural 
holdings  
- Adding value to agricultural and 
forestry products  
- Diversification  
Employment, value added, 
regional GDP, output, trade 
- Setting up of young farmers and early retirement 
measures were assumed to increase retirement pensions 
(i.e. they increase incentives to retire) 
- Measures modernisation, adding value and 
diversification were assumed to reduce capital cost in 
agricultural, food processing, and agrotourism, 
respectively.  
POMMARD 
model/ 
Bergmann and 
Thomson (2008) 
Regional input-
output supply model 
containing 11 
modules. 
Two rural areas from 
Northern Scotland: Caithness 
and Sutherland 
Three scenarios: 1) all current Pillar 
2 expenditure switched 
into Axis 1; 2) all current Pillar 2 
expenditure switched 
into Axis 2; 3) growth of tourist 
industry. 
Various variables: agricultural, 
non-agricultural, life quality, 
environmental, etc.. 
n.a. 
Vollet (1998) Economic base 
model (econometric) 
Five rural regions in France Diversification (residential and 
recreational functions of rural areas). 
Employment: impact of 
recreational and residential 
functions on employment  
The size and statistical significance of estimated 
coefficients corresponding to the relevant variables. 
Cretegny (2002) General equilibrium 
model (includes 
public good which 
enters individual 
utility functions) 
Country level (Swisherland) Multifunctionality Household welfare - Multifunctionality is modelled very generic. It is 
represented as joint production of a public goods and 
agricultural private goods, i.e. public goods are a 
function of direct payments and agricultural production. 
- Direct payments are assumed to remunerate production 
of public goods and create incentive for their provision. 
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Table 1. Continued 
Name of 
model/ Author 
Type of model Regional 
implementation 
Rural policies analyzed / 
modelled 
Impact indicator(s)  Modelling of RDP measures 
SCENAR 2020 Economic models (LEITAP, 
ESIM, CAPRI); biophysical 
IMAGE model; and land use 
allocation model (CLUE-s). 
EU-25 and World regions Three scenarios:  
- baseline: new financial perspective 
- Regionalisation scenario: increase 
in RDP funding. 
- Liberalisation scenario: decrease in 
funding of all RDP axes. 
- Various variables: 
agricultural output, land use, 
employment, agricultural 
income, etc. 
- Long-run developments in 
rural economies. 
n.a. 
EURURALIS/ 
Verburg et al. 
(2008) 
Spatial model: Combination 
of general equilibrium 
GTAP model; biophysical 
IMAGE model; and land use 
allocation model (CLUE-s). 
EU-25 and World regions at 
different scale resolution 
(From global to the local, 
landscape level). 
LFA, Nature conservation Land use n.a. 
Oglethorpe and 
Sanderson 
(1999) 
Farm level partial 
equilibrium model combined 
with ecological model. 
Farm level case study from 
North-East of England 
Agri-environment: farm management 
practices (in terms of stocking 
density, fertilizer use, etc.) related to 
grassland use 
Impact of farm management 
practices on grassland value 
(in terms of diversity and 
abundance of various grass 
species) and farm income. 
Scenarios with alternative management practices 
are simulated. The specific management 
practices are introduced in the model for 
example by restricting the stocking density, 
restricting fertilizers use, etc. Then the effect on 
diversity and abundance of various grass species 
and farm income is analysed. 
PASMA/ Schmid 
and Sinabell 
(2004) 
Mathematical Programming 
model 
Farm level profit 
maximization at Regional 
level in Austria 
LFA and agri-environmental 
measures.  
Various indicators: viability of 
rural areas; output, land use, 
organic farming, etc. 
n.a. 
FARMIS/ 
Schader et al 
2008. 
Mathematical Programming 
model 
Regional, farm group level 
for Germany 
Agri-environment: organic payments, 
extensification payments 
Various variables: income, 
input use, energy use, 
environmental indicators 
The payments affect profitability and uptake 
level of measures. Transaction costs of policies 
are also taken in consideration. 
Haile and 
Slangen (2007) 
Contingent Valuation 
Method (Based on household 
Survey) 
Local area of Winterswijk 
(the Netherlands) 
Agri-environmental measures: 
cultural value of landscapes. 
- Willingness to pay (WTP) 
for cultural value of 
landscapes 
- Factors affecting the WTP 
for cultural value of 
landscapes 
- Econometric estimation of households WTP (in 
Euro) for landscape value. 
- The statistical significance of the estimated 
coefficients determines which factors affect 
WTP.  
SEAMLESS/ 
van Ittersum et 
al. (2008) 
 
Integrated assessment and 
modelling (IAM). Combines 
various models: e.g. APES 
(biophysical model), FSSIM 
(farm mathematical 
programming model), 
SEAMCAP (agricultural 
partial equilibrium model). 
Provides a framework for 
impact analyses at EU level, 
MS, NUTS2, and field-farm 
level. Some resolution levels 
(especially farm level) are 
conditional on data 
availability.  
Designed to access the impact of 
agricultural and agri-environmental 
policies. In the study van Ittersum et 
al. (2008) the model was tested with 
liberalization scenario. 
 
Various environmental, 
economic and social 
indicators.  
n.a. 
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Figure 1. Capital market 
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Figure 2. Income effect of farm investment support with perfect enforcement of 
additionality and no eligibility limits 
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Figure 3. Income effect of farm investment support with perfect enforcement of 
additionality and perfect elastic capital supply 
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Figure 4. Income effect of farm investment support with perfect enforcement of 
additionality and eligibility limits 
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Figure 5. Income effect of farm investment support with imperfect enforcement of 
additionality and no eligibility limits 
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Figure 6. Income effect of farm investment support with imperfect enforcement of 
additionality, perfect elastic capital supply and no eligibility limits 
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Figure 7. Income effect of farm investment support with imperfect enforcement of 
additionality and eligibility limits 
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Figure 8. Income effect of farm investment support with imperfect enforcement of 
additionality  
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Figure 9. Income effect of farm investment support with heterogeneous farms 
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Figure 10. Capital market with credit constraints 
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Figure 11. Income effect of farm investment support with farm credit constraint and 
perfect elastic capital supply when farm access to credit increases by the size of the 
support 
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Figure 12. Income effect of farm investment support with farm credit constraint and 
perfect elastic capital supply when farm access to credit increases by less than the size of 
the support 
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Figure 13. Income effect of farm investment support in the long-run 
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